HB
7388 represents the latest attempt to eliminate America’s unique and
successful presidential system. Abolishing the Electoral College would
be unhealthy for the country and especially detrimental to small states
such as Rhode Island. But eliminating the Electoral College through this
roundabout manner, without going through a formal constitutional
amendment process, carries its own special dangers.
Proponents
claim the National Popular Vote plan outlined in HB 7388 will ensure
that all voters receive equal attention because each vote will have
equal weight. But the truth is the precise opposite: NPV will guarantee
unequal treatment of voters.
Problems Created by NPV
The
plan proposed by NPV is fraught with difficulties—some logistical and
legal, some philosophical. I will discuss these latter issues—arguments
“for” and “against” the Electoral College—in a moment. But the
logistical and legal difficulties of changing the presidential election
process without a constitutional amendment need to be fully explored.
The
current presidential election process blends federalist and democratic
principles. America holds 51 completely separate, purely democratic
elections each presidential election year (each state, plus D.C.). Local
election laws impact the manner in which each of these elections is
held, but any differences among states’ election codes don’t matter. The
unique laws of any particular state impact only voters within that
state. The country holds 51 completely separate elections, and it
achieves 51 different sets of results. Each state’s single goal is to
select a slate of electors that will represent it in the later, national
election among the states. NPV would change this. America would still
hold 51 separate elections, but it would attempt to derive one single
result from these 51 elections. Suddenly, internal variances among
states’ laws—previously irrelevant—would matter a great deal. Differing
state election codes now mean that voters are treated unfairly and
unequally.
Consider
the issue of early voting. Voters in Rhode Island have one set of laws
regarding early voting. Other states might have different provisions
regarding when early voting starts, how long it lasts, or who may early
vote and how they may early vote. These differences in laws do not
matter when Rhode Island voters are participating in their own statewide
election, but if NPV throws voters of all states into the same election
pool, then the differences in laws begin to create many inequities. How
can Rhode Island voters be equal with those in other states when their
election operates under a different set of laws than those applicable to
other voters in the same election pool?
There
are many other differences among states’ laws: States differ in whether
they allow felons to vote. They differ in their requirements for ballot
qualification. States have different criteria for what does (or does
not) trigger recounts within their borders. These differences could
cause a whole host of problems. What if the national total is
close—close enough to warrant a recount—but a recount can’t be conducted
because the margins in individual states were not close? Or perhaps
recounts are conducted, but only in two or three states, each with a
different idea of how to count a hanging chad. Perhaps a fourth state
sees what is going on and chooses to conduct a recount that its statutes
previously deemed optional. Maybe this fourth state has a different
definition of “hanging chad,” and its sole goal is to counteract the
efforts of other states. Inevitably, Rhode Island voters would have to
abide by election results derived from policies with which they
disagree—even if those policies give other states’ voters more chances
to vote. Indeed, other states might purposefully pass very lenient
election laws in the hopes that they will have a bigger impact on the
national total.
Additional
problems are created by the fact that NPV states can’t force others to
participate in a run-off. Thus, NPV gives the presidency to the
candidate winning any plurality.
NPV is not looking for a majority winner. It is not even looking for a
minimum plurality. As a practical matter, it can’t. Thus, a candidate
could win with only 15 or 20 percent of votes nationwide. But it gets
even worse. Under this scheme, Rhode Island could be forced to award its
entire slate of electors to a candidate who was not on its ballot.
Imagine that Ron Paul qualifies for the ballot in Texas and obtains a
winning plurality solely from Texas voters. Paul did not bother to
qualify for the ballot in Rhode Island. Voters in that state did not
have the chance to vote for—or against—him. Yet Rhode Island would still be
forced to award its entire slate of electors to the choice of Texas
voters. Rhode Island probably did not nominate a slate of electors for
Paul because he was not on its ballot. NPV’s compact offers a
questionable solution. Paul would be entitled to personally appoint the
four electors who will represent Rhode Island in the Electoral College
vote. He seems likely to appoint Texans (guaranteed to remain faithful!)
to represent Rhode Island in the presidential election.
Finally,
remember that NPV’s compact is a temporary solution—easy to join and
unjoin, by its own terms—as opposed to a constitutional amendment, which
would be a relatively permanent solution. Imagine that NPV has just
enough states to be operable during the 2012 election. The presidential
campaigns are proceeding on the assumption that a national direct
election will be in place on Election Day. But in late June,
Massachusetts gets worried that the Republican will win the national
popular vote. In disgust, its legislature decides to pull out of NPV’s
compact. Suddenly, NPV no longer has enough states to proceed. The
country is again hosting a normal presidential election with the
Electoral College in place. Well, unless some other state changes its
mind and swiftly adopts NPV for purely political, partisan reasons. This
kind of flip-flopping back and forth is not good for the stability of
the country or its presidential election system.
Formally
eliminating the Electoral College through a constitutional amendment
would be unhealthy for the country. But NPV’s attempt to skirt the
constitutional amendment process altogether would create added
difficulties. These logistical nightmares could haunt the country each
and every presidential election year.
The Benefits of the Electoral College
I
do not mean to imply that the only problem with NPV is its logistical
difficulties. Eliminating the Electoral College would do serious harm to
a country as diverse as our own. The history of the Electoral College
must be understood if its benefits are to be appreciated.
The
Founders’ Constitution seeks to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable
goals: They wanted the people to govern themselves, but they also wanted
to protect minority interests. A pure democracy would not accomplish
this objective: It allows 51 percent of the people to rule the other 49
percent—all the time, without exception. If America were a pure
democracy, imagine what could happen in the wake of an event like 9/11. A
bare majority could enact any law it desired, even if that law were
tyrannical, racist, or penalized religious beliefs. Thus, the
Constitution combines democracy with republicanism and federalism.
Safeguards such as the Senate (one state, one vote), supermajority
requirements to amend the Constitution, and the Electoral College allow
the majority to rule, but only while it acts reasonably. Minority
political interests are protected.
The Benefits of Federalism
Electoral
College opponents argue that presidential elections are undemocratic.
They are wrong. America holds 51 purely democratic elections each
presidential election year (each state, plus D.C.). Such a process
combines democracy and federalism into one process. The result is that
candidates can’t win without nationwide support. Obama can’t rely solely
on big cities in California. Republicans can’t rely solely on Texas.
They must win simultaneous, concurrent majorities nationwide. They can’t
achieve those victories unless they reach out to a wide variety of
voters. They will fail if they rely upon isolated pockets of support in
one region or among voters in one special interest group.
Many
dispute that our system creates national coalition-building, arguing
that it instead causes a disproportionate focus on mid-sized “swing”
states. These arguments appear true if we focus on one or a handful of
election years in isolation. But if we look at the states’ full
histories of voting, we see that the identity of “swing” and “safe”
states changes all the time. California is often viewed as irreversibly
Democrat, but it voted for Republican candidate George H.W. Bush as
recently as 1988. Texas used to be as undeniably Democrat as it is
Republican today. States such as Georgia, Kentucky, and Louisiana all
voted for Bill Clinton in the 1990s, but they were considered very safe
Republican states in 2008.
Ultimately,
the Electoral College ensures that the political parties must reach out
to all the states. As a matter of history, no political party has ever
been able to ignore any state for too long without feeling the
ramifications at the polls.
Moderation and Compromise
The
most likely consequence of a change to a direct popular vote is the
breakdown of the two-party system. Today, third-party candidates do not
receive much support. In a direct popular election, everything changes. A
vote for Ross Perot or Ralph Nader is no longer “wasted,” and the
number of presidential candidates would increase. Voters would fracture
their votes across many candidates. The result will be lower vote totals
per candidate and an increased likelihood that two or more candidates
will have close popular vote totals. Recounts would proliferate. Worse,
extremist candidates could more easily sway an election, because no
candidate is required to obtain majority support.
NPV
proponents argue that the President should have the support of most
Americans. But in real life, “most” Americans will never agree on their
ideal candidate. Individuals’ opinions differ too greatly. Given the
general inability to obtain majority consensus (or even the consensus of
a large plurality), the Electoral College provides the country with the
next best alternative. Electing Presidents by states’ electoral votes,
rather than individuals’ votes, creates a method of electing a President
who is a good compromise candidate for most Americans, as represented
by their states. The Electoral College requires moderation, compromise,
and coalition-building from any candidate before he can be successful.
Stability and Certainty in Elections.
The
Electoral College encourages stability and certainty in our political
system. Events such as those that occurred in 2000 are rare. The
Electoral College typically produces quick and undisputed election
outcomes for two reasons: First, the system (along with the
winner-take-all rule) tends to magnify the margin of victory, giving the
victor a certain and demonstrable election outcome. Such certainty
can’t be provided by a direct popular election. Popular votes are often
close, and these close votes can result in constant litigation and
recounts. Second, the system controls the impact of fraud and error. In
part, this is because it is difficult to predict where stolen votes will
make a difference to the national outcome. But if one person can
identify a problematic state (think Ohio in 2004), then, in all
likelihood, everyone knows and that area is closely watched. It becomes
harder to steal votes. To the degree that fraud and errors do occur, the
Electoral College makes it possible to isolate the problem to one or a
handful of states. The country is given a clear set of problems to
resolve one way or another before moving on to a definitive election
outcome.
Conclusion
The
Electoral College is an important safeguard in our constitutional
system of checks and balances, and it is critical to the success of our
nation’s republican democracy. I urge you to protect the Electoral
College by voting “no” on HB 7388.
